Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
UWRG Working Papers

Usery Workplace Research Group

4-3-2009

Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for
Undocumented Workers
Julie L. Hotchkiss
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, julie.l.hotchkiss@atl.frb.org

Myriam Quispe-Agnoli
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, myriam.quispe-agnoli@atl.frb.org

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers

Recommended Citation
Hotchkiss, Julie L. and Quispe-Agnoli, Myriam, "Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for
Undocumented Workers" (2009). UWRG Working Papers. 311.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers/311

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Usery Workplace Research Group at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in UWRG Working Papers by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

W.J. Usery Workplace Research Group Paper Series

Working Paper 2009-4-3
April 2009

Employer Monopsony Power
in the Labor Market for
Undocumented Workers
Julie Hotchkiss
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Myriam Quispe-Agnoli
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

This paper can be downloaded at: http://aysps.gsu.edu/usery/Papers.html

ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL
OF POLICY STUDIES

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA

Employer Monopsony Power in the
Labor Market for Undocumented Workers
Julie L. Hotchkiss and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli
Working Paper 2009-14
April 2009

WORKING PAPER SERIES

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK o f ATLANTA

WORKING PAPER SERIES

Employer Monopsony Power in the
Labor Market for Undocumented Workers
Julie L. Hotchkiss and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli
Working Paper 2009-14
April 2009
Abstract: Using matched employer-employee data from the state of Georgia, this paper investigates the
potential for employer monopsony power in the labor market for undocumented workers. We find that the
labor supply elasticity of undocumented workers is about 13 percent lower than that estimated for
documented workers, suggesting that at least some of the observed wage gap between documented and
undocumented workers can be explained by firms’ exploiting their monopsony power. There is also
evidence of some displacement, with the hiring of undocumented workers being associated with a small
amount of documented worker separation.
JEL classification: J42, J61, J2
Key words: labor demand, monopsony, illegal immigration, undocumented workers

J. David Brown, Curtis Flores, Gordon Hanson, Federico Mandelman, Pia Orrenius, Eric Smith, Dan Waggoner, and Madeline
Zavodny provided helpful comments. The authors thank Nicole Baerg, Gustavo Canavire, M. Laurel Graefe, and Gustavo Uceda
for research assistance. The views expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility.
Please address questions regarding content to Julie Hotchkiss (contact author), Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30309-4470, 404-498-8198, julie.l.hotchkiss@atl.frb.org, or Myriam QuispeAgnoli, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30309-4470, 404-4988930, myriam.quispe-agnoli@atl.frb.org.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, are available on the Atlanta Fed’s Web site at
www.frbatlanta.org. Click “Publications” and then “Working Papers.” Use the WebScriber Service (at www.frbatlanta.org) to
receive e-mail notifications about new papers.

Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers

I. Introduction and Background
The model of monopsonistic discrimination was developed by Robinson (1933) to
describe a labor market in which two groups of equally productive workers (men and women)
are paid different wages because they differ in their elasticities of labor supply. Robinson
theorized that women were paid less than men because they were limited in their alternative
labor market options as a result of their husbands' employment situations. The source of the
firm's monopsonistic power in the labor market derives from the behavior of workers, not from
the degree of competition in the firm's product market. In other words, the presence of a large
number of competitive firms does not preclude monopsonistic discrimination. In fact, a greater
degree of product market competition will put additional pressures on an employer to take
advantage of differential labor supply elasticities across workers.1 The purpose of this paper is to
use a unique employer-employee matched data set to determine whether there is any empirical
evidence of employers practicing monopsonistic discrimination against undocumented workers.
If such evidence is found, it suggests that tighter restrictions on illegal immigration will raise
production costs of firms and likely prices paid by consumers. The analysis also has
implications for potential employer opposition to tighter immigration policies.
The presence of monopsonistic employer power has been identified in a number of
settings. Evidence of potential monopsonistic discrimination against women as a result of lower
labor supply elasticities (relative to men) is provided by Hirsch et al. (2006) and Barth and DaleOlsen (1999).2 Scully (1989) and Zimbalist (1992) provide evidence of monopsonistic

1

See Bhaskar et al. (2002), page 167.
See Ofek and Merrill (1997) for empirical evidence of women facing fewer employment opportunities as a result
of being geographically constrained by their husband's employment choices.

2
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discrimination (at least through the 1980s) in baseball for players that are contractually limited in
their employment options by being tied to one team before achieving free-agent status. Scott et
al. (1985) offer similar evidence for basketball players. In the case where workers are divided
and one group is paid less than an equally productive different group, Lang et al. (2005) present
a theoretical model in which monopsonistic labor market outcomes can arise in equilibrium and
does not necessarily require firms to overtly discriminate against the lower-paid group. It only
requires that the disadvantaged group think employers are discriminatory. They offer this model
as explanation for the persistent wage gap between black and white workers.3 The labor market
for undocumented workers meets the classic conditions in which employers can be successful in
practicing monopsonistic discrimination--identifiable characteristics on which groups of workers
can be segmented, and one of the groups of workers being limited in their employment
opportunities.
First of all, documented and undocumented workers in the U.S. are believed to be
distinguishable from one another without much effort. The Department of Homeland Security
estimates for January 2008 that 61 percent of unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico
(Hoefer et al. 2009). Clearly not all Hispanic individuals are undocumented, but, in the absence
of time consuming document verification, ethnicity and language proficiency may be used by
employers as a proxy for their best guess of whether a worker is undocumented. Second, for fear
of being deported, undocumented workers are likely unwilling to complain about low wages or
poor employment environments. It is also not unreasonable to expect that the more employers to
which undocumented workers expose themselves, the higher the risk of deportation. And
indeed, it is likely that there are many firms who will simply refuse to hire undocumented

3

Raphael and Riker (1999) offer empirical evidence for the role geographic mobility plays in limiting the
employment opportunities of blacks, thus contributing to observed racial wage differentials.
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workers or that undocumented workers are geographically constrained by the support (or lack) of
social networks. All of these factors reduce employment opportunities of undocumented
workers, ceteris paribus. Stark (2007) presents a compelling theoretical mechanism through
which the work effort of undocumented workers is increased as their probability of deportation
increases, which, in turn expands the wedge between undocumented worker productivity and
their wage. Semple (2008) offers anecdotal evidence that undocumented workers are at the
mercy of their employers. An undocumented worker reported to Semple that an employer
refused to pay him about $1,000 he was owed for work performed, but that, "fear [of being
deported] kept my mouth shut."
Very little empirical investigation of the labor market experiences of undocumented
workers exists. DeFreitas (1988) and Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) investigate the wage
impact of the presence of undocumented workers, finding modest impacts that vary across
worker skill level and across sectors. Brown et al. (2008) presents evidence that employing
undocumented workers gives firms a fairly significant competitive advantage, suggesting that the
lower wages paid to undocumented workers likely derives from a monopsonistic position of the
employer, rather than making up for lower productivity of the workers. This paper estimates
labor supply elasticities for documented and undocumented workers, finding evidence that
undocumented workers are less sensitive to wages than their documented co-workers. There is
also modest evidence of displacement of documented workers as more undocumented workers
arrive, although the analysis is not able to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
displacement effects.
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II. The Data
The primary data used for the analyses in this paper are the Employer File and the
Individual Wage File, compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of
administering the state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. These data are highly
confidential and strictly limited in their distribution. The data are available from the first quarter
of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2006. The Employer File provides an almost complete
census of firms in the U.S., covering approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers
(Committee on Ways and Means 2004).4 The establishment-level information includes the
number of employees, the total wage bill, and the NAICS classification of each establishment.
The Individual Wage File, which links individual workers to their employer, is used to construct
workforce characteristics at the firm level, such as workforce churning and the share of new hires
that is undocumented. We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data to calculate the
firm’s age, turnover rates, and worker tenure. The data also contain a 6-digit NAICS industry
code and the county of location, allowing us to construct or merge in industry- and county-level
indicators, such as county unemployment rate.
Regrettably, the data set contains no information about workers' demographics or, more
importantly, immigration status. However, again making use of the longitudinal nature of the
data, we estimate an individual fixed-effects model, allowing us to control for individual
characteristics that do not vary over time (e.g., innate human capital, immigration status).
A. Identifying Invalid Social Security Numbers
Every quarter employers must file a report with their state's Department of Labor
detailing all wages paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935. Each
4

Certain jobs in agriculture, domestic services, non-profit organizations are excluded from UI coverage and,
therefore these workers are not included in the data (Committee on Ways and Means 2004). For information about
which workers are covered, see U.S. Department of Labor (2008).
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worker on this report is identified by his/her social security number (SSN). There are a number
of ways in which one can establish that a reported social security number is invalid. The Social
Security Administration provides a service by which an employer can upload a file of SSNs for
checking, but one must register as an employer to obtain this service.5 In addition, there are
several known limitations on what can be considered a valid social security number, so a simple
algorithm is used to check whether each number conforms to the valid parameters.
There are three pieces to a SSN.6 The first three numbers are referred to as the Area
Number. This number is assigned based on the state in which the application for a SSN was
made; it does not necessarily reflect the state of residence. The lowest Area Number possible is
001 and the highest Area Number ever issued, as of December 2006, is 772. Using information
provided by the SSA, the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are first assigned
can be determined. Any SSN with an Area Number equal to 000, greater than 772, or which
shows up before the officially assigned date, will be considered invalid.
The second piece of a SSN consists of the two-digit Group Number. The lowest group
number is 01, and they are assigned in non-consecutive order. Any SSN with a Group Number
equal to 00 or with a Group Number that appears in the data out of sequence with the Area
Number will be considered invalid.
The last four digits of a SSN are referred to as the Serial Number. These are assigned
consecutively from 0001 to 9999. Any SSN with a Serial Number equal to 0000 is invalid.
In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identification
Number (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to file a tax return (the first

5

See Social Security Number Verification Service <http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnv.htm>.
Historical information and information about valid SSNs can be found at the Social Security Administration's web
sites: <http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/geocard.html>, <http://www.xocialsecurity.gov/employer/stateweb.htm>,
and <http://www.socialsecurity.gov/employer/ssnvhighgroup.htm >.
6
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ITIN was issued in 1997). It is simply a "tax processing number," and does not authorize an
individual to work in the U.S. Employers are instructed by the IRS to "not accept an ITIN in
place of a SSN for employee identification for work. An ITIN is only available to resident and
nonresident aliens who are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identification for other tax
purposes."7 ITIN numbers have a "9" in the first digit of the Area Number and a "7" or "8" in the
first digit of the Group Number. Anyone with this numbering scheme will be identified as
having an invalid Area Number, as they are not authorized to work. The percent of SSN with
high area numbers that also match the ITIN numbering scheme has risen from about one percent
in 1997 to over 60 percent by the end of 2006. Identifying undocumented workers with ITIN
numbers will be important in the fixed-effects estimation described below.
A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because
they had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets.8 Apparently, some
people who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and started
using them as their own. If any of these 21 "pocketbook" SSNs appear in the data, they are
considered invalid, although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential. In addition, a
number of SSNs are exactly equal to the employer identification number. These are invalid,
primarily because they have too few digits. In any instance where a SSN is used for more than
one person on a firm's UI wage report or does not have the required number of digits (including
zeros), the SSN is considered invalid.
The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else
poses a special problem. First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across firms in one
quarter for workers with different surnames (the wage report includes the first three characters of
7

"Hiring Employees," <http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98164,00.html>. Also see, "Individual
Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN)," <http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96287,00.html>.
8
See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1990).
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the workers' surnames). With this information alone, it is not possible to know which worker is
using the SSN fraudulently and who the valid owner of the number is. If one of the
SSN/surname pairs shows up in the data initially in a quarter by itself, this is the pair that is
considered valid and all other duplicates (with different surnames) are considered invalid.
B. Does "Invalid" mean "Undocumented?"
Not all invalid SSN are classified as undocumented workers; examining the patterns of
incidence of different types of invalid SSNs suggests that some types are firm generated rather
than worker generated. Figure 1 illustrates the incidence patterns across types of invalid SSNs in
construction. This pattern is consistently found in the other sectors as well. The percent of
workers with SSNs having a high area number or out-of-sequence group number displays the
expected growth in undocumented workers (see Hoefer et al. 2007), whereas the incidence of
SSNs for other reasons exhibits a flat to declining, highly seasonal pattern. The strong seasonal
nature of the other invalid reasons suggests that firms are temporarily assigning invalid SSN
numbers to workers before having time to gather the information for the purpose of record
keeping/reporting. Or, firms may decide to not bother obtaining a SSN for workers who will
only be employed a very short time.9 The high degree of churning observed among workers with
invalid SSNs for these other reasons is consistent with either of these practices.10
[Figure 1 here]
Since there is no way to know whether a temporary assignment by the firm of an invalid
SSN is to merely cover for temporary employment of an undocumented worker or to allow the
firm to file its wage report before having had a chance to record the worker's valid SSN, the

9

Indeed, a worker has 90 days to resolve a discrepancy that results in the receipt of a "no-match" letter from the
Social Security Administration. The employee may be long gone before such a letter is even received.
10
The average churning rates for SSNs with invalid area numbers, invalid group numbers, duplicate SSNs with
different surnames, and invalid for other reasons are 26.9%, 55.7%, 188.3%, and 215.6%, respectively.
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analysis below takes the conservative tack by considering as undocumented only those workers
whose SSNs are classified as invalid because the area number is too high or the group number is
assigned out of sequence. This will clearly undercount the actual number of undocumented
workers, so that any effect identified in the analysis will also likely under-estimate the true effect
of the presence of undocumented workers on firm exit. We take pains, however, to not include
workers with invalid SSNs for these other reasons in the construction of worker characteristics
among workers with valid SSNs. However, they are included in counts of aggregate firm
employment.
Figure 2 plots the prevalence of undocumented workers in the six broadly defined sectors
with the highest incidences.11 The concentration of workers in these sectors was also identified
nationally by Fortuny et al. (2007).12 The pattern of growth is also consistent with Fortuny et al.
who estimate that 72 percent of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia arrived in the last 10 years.
[Figure 2 here]
Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that 4.5 percent of the workforce in Georgia was
undocumented in 2004. In our sample 1.2 percent of workers are classified as undocumented in
2004. The implication is that the sample used for the analysis in this paper is capturing at least
26 percent of all undocumented workers in the state of Georgia. This is a respectable
representation, given that to be included in the sample an undocumented worker must be
reported by the employer to the Department of Labor in the first place, and that we are being
very conservative in the identification of workers as undocumented.

11

Agriculture is excluded from the graph for display purposes; the pattern of employment is considerably more
seasonal and the percent of workers that is undocumented in agriculture reached just under six percent by 2006.
12
Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that nationally in 2004 the percent of workers in leisure and hospitality and
construction that was undocumented was 10 percent each, nine percent of workers in agriculture, and six percent
each in manufacturing, professional and business services, and other services.
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C. Are Undocumented Workers Correctly Identified?
It is crucial to establish confidence in the mechanism employed to identify undocumented
workers. The Department of Homeland Security estimates for January 2008 that 61 percent of
unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico (Hoefer et al. 2009). Clearly not all Hispanic
individuals are unauthorized immigrants, but a first test of the accuracy of identifying
undocumented workers might be to compare the geographic distribution of those identified as
undocumented for the purposes of analysis in this paper and the geographic distribution of
various ethnic and racial groups across counties in the state. Table 1 presents these correlation
coefficients for 2005.
[Table 1 here]
The correlation between the percent of the county population that is Hispanic and the
percent of workers in the county identified as undocumented is 0.18 (of course, some individuals
may live and work in different counties). The correlations with the percent that is Asian and the
percent that is African American in the counties are both negative. The correlation of the percent
of firms in the county employing undocumented workers with ethnicity is also positive and
highest as it relates the percent of the county population that is Hispanic (0.38). The correlation
of the presence of these firms with percent of the county population that is Asian is also positive,
but smaller at 0.27; the correlation with the percent of the population that is African American is
again negative.
Additionally, the rate of growth seen in both the number and percent of undocumented
workers identified in Georgia matches closely the rate of growth in the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) earnings suspense file (ESF). The ESF is a repository of social security
taxes paid by employers that cannot be matched to a valid name or SSN. It is widely believed
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that this growth in the ESF reflects growing incidence of unauthorized work in the U.S.
(Bovbjerg 2006).
Figure 3 plots the number of workers identified (panel a) and the percent of workers
identified (panel b) as undocumented along with the size of the ESF. This figure shows a
remarkable consistency between the growth seen in workers identified as undocumented and the
ESF. Payments on wages in the ESF reflect only about four percent of all initial non-matching
earnings reports (the others were resolved through an error identification process). In addition,
about 43 percent of employers associated with wage payments that end up in the ESF come from
only five of 83 broad industry classifications, with eating and drinking establishments (leisure
and hospitality, 17 percent) and construction (10 percent) being the largest contributors
(Bovbjerg 2006).
[Figure 3 here]
The positive correlation between the Hispanic population across counties in Georgia and
the percent of workers identified as undocumented for this analysis, as well as closely matching
growth in undocumented workers identified in Georgia and growth in the SSA ESF
independently suggest that the mechanism employed in this paper to identify undocumented
workers is accurate.
D. Sample Means
For reasons discussed below, the analysis is constrained to include workers only between
1995 and 2000 inclusive. Table 2 presents some means for this sample of workers. In addition,
the table contains means for an even smaller sub-set of undocumented workers whose SSN
numbers follow the number scheme of ITIN numbers; this sample is only valid starting in 1997,
when the first ITIN number was issued.
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[Table 2 here]
Documented workers earn 50 percent more, on average, than undocumented workers.
Some of this wage differential could be because of the concentration of undocumented workers
in lower-paying industries or occupations, undocumented workers working fewer hours, or the
upward push in the occupational chain of documented workers with the arrival of lower-skilled
undocumented workers (Pedace 2006).13 The undocumented wage gap increases as workers
move up the wage distribution.
Undocumented workers are likely to have been on their current job a shorter amount of
time and reflect greater separation behavior (not holding anything else constant). Undocumented
workers appear to be concentrated among smaller employers who experience a greater degree of
churning among its documented workforce, suggesting a need for workforce flexibility, as has
been documented among firms that employ undocumented workers (Morales 1983-1984). The
smaller firm size could be reflecting the typical size of firms in industries more likely to hire
undocumented workers. The higher share of new hires that is undocumented among the
undocumented sample suggests that undocumented workers are concentrated in certain
industries.
There are some notable differences in the distribution of workers across industry skill
intensity and NAICS classification.14 Most notably, undocumented workers are more
concentrated in agriculture, construction, and leisure and hospitality. Interestingly,
undocumented workers using ITIN numbers are more similarly distributed across industry skill
intensity relative to documented workers than all undocumented workers are.

13

The magnitude of the wage penalties is consistent with the finding by Rivera-Batiz (1999) that legal immigrants
earn about 42 percent more than illegal immigrants.
14
Appendix B describes the construction of skill classifications.

- 11 -

III. Theoretical and Empirical Framework
A. Elasticities of Separation
Appealing to a simple version of the standard search problem and assuming that workers
are more willing to work for firms paying higher wages, the following separation rates for
documented and undocumented workers can be derived:15

S d (w; F d [w]) = δ + λ d (1 − F d [ w])
S u (w; F u [ w]) = δ + λ u (1 − F u [w])

,

(1)

where S k is the separation rate of documented (k=d) and undocumented (k=u) workers; δ is the
job destruction rate, assumed to be the same for documented and undocumented workers; and λ k
is the job offer arrival rate for documented and undocumented workers. The mere presence of
some firms that will not hire undocumented workers means the offer arrival rate is lower for
undocumented workers than for documented workers, λ u ≤ λ d .
Based on the assumptions leading to equation (1) and the additional labor market
constraints that undocumented workers face, undocumented workers are expected to draw wage
offers from a distribution ( F u [w] ) that is stochastically dominated by the wage offer

,
distribution that documented workers face ( F d [w] ), implying that at any given wage, w
 ] ≤ F u [w
 ] , or Pr[W d ≤ w
 ] ≤ Pr[W u ≤ w
 ] . The lower offer arrival rate and stochastically
F d [w
 , the separation rate
inferior wage distribution lead to the result that for any given wage, w
among undocumented workers is lower than among documented workers:16

15

See Burdett and Mortensen (1988), Manning (2003, sections 2.2 and 4.4), and Ransom and Oaxaca (2007). The
basic assumptions of the model are that firms have identical constant returns to scale, workers are identical, each
worker has the same value of leisure, some workers are employed and others are unemployed, and workers can
search while employed. The main implication from the equilibrium search model (that is relevant for this paper) is
that the firm has to offer a higher wage to attract more workers. Also see Jovanovic (1979) whose job matching
model also predicts that workers paid a higher wage are less likely to separate from their employers.
16
This result only requires one of the two conditions--lower offer arrival rate or stochastically inferior wage offer
distribution--but it is not unreasonable to expect both of these conditions to be satisfied.
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 ; F u [w
 ]) ≤ S d (w
 ; F d [w
 ]) .
S u (w

(2)

This result is consistent with DeFreitas (1988) who finds that Hispanic immigrants (although not
necessarily undocumented) do not exhibit higher turnover tendencies than documented workers
when comparing equally skilled workers in the same sectors. The ability of firms to exploit their
monospony power is predicated not on how often workers separate, but on how sensitive that
separation behavior is to changes in the wage. Constructing the elasticity of separation allows a
comparison of workers' sensitivity to wage changes abstracting from expected wage level of the
workers.
From equation (2), the elasticity of separation with respect to the wage for worker of type
k, evaluated at the expected wage for that worker type ( wk ) is:

⎧ ∂S k [ w; F k ( w)] w ⎫
−λ k f k [ w]w
=
<0.
⎬
∂w
S k ( w) ⎭ w= wk
S k ( w) w= wk
⎩

k
=⎨
ε Sw
w= w
k

(3)

In general, for which group of workers the elasticity is larger cannot be determined analytically;
the shape of the wage offer density function relative to the expected wage for each group will
ultimately determine the relative sizes of the elasticity. The point is, knowing that the wage offer
distribution of documented workers stochastically dominates the wage offer distribution of
undocumented workers indicates that the separation rate of documented workers exceeds that of
undocumented workers (within the framework of this simple search model and at a given wage).
However, it does not tell us how sensitive the workers will be to wage changes, relative to one
another.
B. Elasticities of Labor Supply
A technique suggested by Ransom and Oaxaca (2008) is used to estimate the labor supply
elasticity of documented and undocumented workers based on estimates of workers' separation
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elasticities (also see Barth and Dale-Olsen 2009).17 This technique relies on two assumptions.
First, it requires that the flow of recruits (or new hires) equals the flow of separations; that one
employer's separation is another employer's recruitment. This assumption would not necessarily
be valid in circumstances of very weak labor markets. The years 1995-2000 are the years in the
data that could be considered to satisfy this requirement. Each year during this time period, the
percent of workers that is separating and the percent of workers being hired differ by, at most,
three percentage points, except for the subset of undocumented workers with ITIN numbers,
where the difference can be slightly greater.18 However, among all groups of workers over this
time period, the percent being hired always exceeds the percent separating.
A second assumption is required as a result of how undocumented workers are identified.
Since undocumented workers are defined as those using certain types of invalid SSNs, it is not
reasonable to expect that an undocumented worker would use the same SSN when moving from
one employer to another. Consequently, the worker's SSN cannot be used as a worker fixed
effect within the undocumented sample. A worker fixed effect is constructed by combining the
worker's SSN and the employer id number (SSN/EMPID) so that multiple observations within an
employer are treated as observations from the same person, but the same SSN across employers
will be treated as different workers.19 This is less than ideal, but necessary to boost the number
of undocumented observations. The presence of ITIN numbers, however, does provide a type of
robustness check on the results. The analysis will be repeated for the years 1997 (the first year

17

As they point out, it is much easier to estimate the elasticity of separation than it is to estimation the elasticity of
labor supply (or elasticity of recruitment). Bhaskar et al. (2002) also make use of estimated separation elasticities to
make inferences about employer monopsony power, emphasizing that the focus on separation elasticities is not a
focus on the level of turnover, but on the sensitivity of those separations to the wage. Also see Barth and DaleOlsen (2009) who exploit the same relationship in a firm-level analysis of labor supply elasticity differences
between men and women.
18
The average annual separation and new hire rates are only statistically significantly different from each other
among documented workers at the 90 percent confidence level.
19
Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) construct a similar "worker/work-place" fixed effect for their analysis.
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ITIN numbers were issued) through 2000, with the undocumented worker sample restricted to
workers whose reported SSN matches the ITIN number scheme. Then the SSN by itself will be
used as the worker fixed effect, assuming that undocumented workers with ITIN numbers will
use the same number across employers. The problem that arises with this specification is a lack
of degrees of freedom; workers with ITIN numbers represent only about two percent of the entire
undocumented worker sample and requiring at least two observations per worker cuts the sample
even more. The results generally lead to the same conclusions regarding labor supply elasticities
as those reported using the SSN/EMPID fixed effect.
Given these considerations, the labor supply elasticity can be estimated as the negative of
two times the separation elasticity (see Ransom and Oaxaca 2008, p. 4):
k
k
ε nw
= −2ε sw
> 0,

(4)

u
d
with equation (4) implying that ε nw
.
≤ ε nw

Workers' separation elasticities, then, are estimated by first estimating the following
linear probability separation equation separately for documented workers (k=d) and for
undocumented workers (k=u):20
ln
where

(5)

is the probability that worker i separates from employer n (in industry j) in quarter t;

is the real quarterly wage observed for worker i in quarter t;
in firm n that are undocumented; and

is the percent of new hires

are other characteristics of the worker, firm, industry

at time t that might affect the rate of separation.

20

is a continuous regressor defined as Y.Q,

There is a class of workers that have invalid SSNs but does not meet our criteria for "undocumented." These
workers are described in Section II.B. and are excluded from both the documented and undocumented worker
samples. A linear probability model is estimated as opposed to a probit model because of the large number of fixed
effects included.
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where year Y ∈ [97,100] and quarter Q ∈ [00,75]. 21

is the individual fixed effect defined as

the worker's reported SSN. The percent of new hires in firm n at time t that are undocumented is
calculated as hnt = 100*[ H ntu /( H ntu + H ntd )] , where H k is the number of undocumented (k=u) and
documented (k=d) workers hired by the firm during the previous four quarters.
In order to control for the possibility that undocumented workers are drawn to industries
experiencing a rising relative demand for their skills or to industries that have a history of hiring
undocumented workers (see Card and DiNardo 2000), the share of workers in the 6-digit NAICS
industry that are undocumented is also included as a regressor. The standard errors will be
adjusted for clustering at the firm level, since multiple workers may be employed by the same
firm. A worker is considered separated if the worker's SSN disappears from the employer's files
for at least four consecutive quarters.
In addition to the regressors of particular interest, worker tenure is included and is
expected to be negatively related to worker separation (Jovanovic 1979). The age and size of the
worker's firm and the churning of workers by the firm are expected to affect observed individual
separations (Burgess et al. 2001);22 both older and larger firms are expected to have hiring
mechanisms in place to generate more successful hires, thus less separation. County level
unemployment rate is also included to control for general local labor market conditions.23
Given the estimation results from equation (5), the average separation elasticity with
respect to wages for workers of type k can be calculated as follows:
21

A continuous regressor is chosen for parsimony; using dichotomous year and quarter indicators does not alter
conclusions presented here.
22
Churning is measured as the difference between worker flows and job flows divided by the average employment
during the period. Worker flows is the sum of hires and separations and job flows is net employment change.
/

,

is the number of workers in time t (Burgess et al. 2001).

23

Due to limited degrees of freedom among the undocumented worker sample, we've included what we consider the
bare minimum regressors. Additional regressors were investigated, such as county level firm birth and death rates
and a measure of market competitiveness; their inclusion did not change the results on the regressors of interest or
the conclusions presented here.
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1
ε = k
N
k
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∂s wi
1 kN 1
=
γˆ1 ∑ ,
∑
N k i =1 si
i =1 ∂w si
Nk

k

(6)

where N k is the total number of workers of type k (Ransom and Oaxaca 2008, p. 12). The
average labor supply elasticity for workers of type k, then, from equation (4), is ε nwk = −2ε swk .
To the extent that the arrival of undocumented workers depresses wages in a labor market
or results in employers substituting documented workers with undocumented workers, an
outflow of documented workers is expected. This potential outflow could not only affect
estimates of the wage impact, but could also have considerable social welfare impacts if
documented workers were flowing into unemployment (rather than to merely another job). The
impact of undocumented worker inflow on separation behavior can also be investigated using the
estimates obtained from equation (5). The average separation elasticity with respect to the share
of new hires that is undocumented is calculated as:

1
ε = k
N
k
sh

N
∂s hi
1
h
= k γˆ2k ∑ i .
∑
N
i =1 ∂h si
i =1 si
Nk

k

(7)

The average separation elasticity with respect to the hiring of undocumented workers gives us
some indication of the degree of displacement taking place. Documented workers may
voluntarily separate from their employers as wages are driven lower or in anticipation of losing
their jobs down the road. Involuntary displacement would be the direct replacement of
documented workers with undocumented workers. The analysis, however, will not be able to
distinguish between the types of displacement.
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IV. Results
A. Full Sample
Table 3 contains the OLS fixed-effects linear probability estimates for equation (5),
estimated for the full sample of individuals from 1995 through 2000, using the combined
SSN/EMPID as the worker fixed effect. Estimates are presented for documented and
undocumented workers separately.
[Table 3 here]
As expected, higher paid workers and workers with longer tenure have lower
probabilities of separation. Workers employed at older, smaller, and firms with more workforce
churning are more likely to separate. The share of workers in the industry that is undocumented
does not appear to affect individual separation rates, but the greater the share of new hires that is
undocumented at the firm increases workers' separation. Although only significant among
documented workers, the greater the county level unemployment rate, the less likely a worker is
to separate, which is consistent with worker effort models (for example, see Machin and
Manning 1992).
The parameter estimate on log wage is transformed into an average labor supply elasticity
and reported at the bottom of the table. As hypothesized, undocumented workers are less
sensitive (about 13 percent less sensitive) to wage changes than documented workers (the
differences are more dramatic among different groups of workers as will be discussed below). A
one percent decrease in the wage reduces the supply of undocumented workers by 0.49 percent,
but reduces the supply of documented workers by 0.57 percent.24 In other words, documented

24

While the focus here is not on the actual point estimate, but rather their relative size across worker status, these
labor supply elasticities are within the range of those estimated by others. For example, Costa (2000) estimated
cross-sectional labor supply elasticities for men and women of 0.04 and 0.13, respectively; Benjamin et al. (2007)
estimated an elasticity of 0.24 for real estate brokers. Bhaskar et al. (2002) report elasticities that would be in the
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workers are more likely than undocumented workers to quit their jobs in response to a wage
reduction.
In addition, newly arriving undocumented workers appear to have a greater impact on
displacing earlier arriving undocumented workers than on displacing documented workers. A
one percent increase in the share of new hires that are undocumented increases the separation of
documented workers by only 0.001 percent and undocumented workers by 0.03 percent. This
result is consistent with that of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Lalonde and Topel (1991) who
find that the arrival of immigrants negatively impacts the labor market outcomes of earlier
arrivals more than those of natives.
B. Estimates Across Income Groups and Sectors
Estimated elasticities for the full sample might be masking more dramatic differences
within subsets of workers. Labor supply elasticities estimated separately across wage groups and
broad industry characteristics are reported in the first two columns of Table 4 and they tell a
remarkably consistent story. With only a very few exceptions, undocumented workers are
significantly less sensitive to wage changes than documented workers. Undocumented workers
are also consistently more likely to be displaced by newly arriving undocumented workers than
are documented workers; the displacement elasticity estimates across worker groups are found in
the first two columns of Table 5.
[Tables 4 and 5 here]
Across both types of workers, the elasticity of labor supply increases in the wage level,
with higher paid workers more sensitive to wage changes than lower paid workers, then
decreases (becomes negative among documented workers) at the highest wage level. This

range of 0.7 and 1.2. Ransom and Oaxaca (2007), in their single-firm study, estimated elasticities close to 2.0 for
both men and women.
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pattern of elasticities across wage groups is indicative of a labor supply curve that starts out
concave then has a transition point between the third and fourth quartile. Although not
significant, a negative labor supply elasticity among documented workers is consistent with a
backward bending labor supply curve found by others among higher income workers (e.g., Hall
1973).25 Comparing elasticities across quartiles, it appears that the overall weaker sensitivity to
wage changes among undocumented workers is being driven by the behavior of workers in the
bottom half of the wage distribution, which is where most undocumented workers find
themselves.
Across broad sector classifications and grouping workers by their industry's skill level,
undocumented workers are less sensitive to wage changes than documented workers, with the
only exception being construction and leisure and hospitality. These are notable given the
relatively large representation of undocumented workers in those sectors. However, Yueh
(2008) presents evidence suggesting that workers with larger social networks will exhibit greater
labor supply elasticities (ceteris paribus) than those with smaller social networks, and we would
expect this "social network" effect to be strongest in sectors with a larger concentration of
undocumented workers, such as construction and leisure and hospitality.
Another notable difference is that documented workers become more sensitive as skill
intensity increases, but undocumented workers become less sensitive. This may be because the
number of higher skill job opportunities are fewer and far between than low skill job
opportunities for undocumented workers.

25

This pattern of increasing, then decreasing labor supply elasticities across income quartiles is also consistent with
own wage elasticities estimated by Hotchkiss and Moore (2007) across education levels.
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C. Robustness Check
Using the combined SSN and employer id for the worker fixed effect we lose the link
between workers across employers. In order to see whether this sacrifice affects the basic
conclusions, the separation equation was re-estimated including only those undocumented
workers whose SSN matches the ITIN number scheme, on the assumption that if a worker is
using an ITIN number, he/she will use it across multiple employers. The years are restricted to
1997 through 2000 since 1997 is the first year ITIN numbers were issued. The sample of
undocumented workers is reduced substantially from over 100,000 observations to about 1,300
observations. The results of these estimations across worker groups are reported in the last two
columns of Tables 4 and 5.
For the full samples, there is a greater difference in the labor supply elasiticities across
worker status, with a one percent decrease in the wage increasing separation among documented
workers by 0.62 percent, but among undocumented workers by only 0.48 percent. Except for the
first quartile of wages, the first category of skill intensity, retail trade, and the leisure and
hospitality sector, all other estimates of the labor supply elasticities (that are significantly
different from zero) reinforce the conclusion that undocumented workers are less sensitive to
wage changes than documented workers. Generally, the year restriction and use of the SSN
fixed effect (as opposed to the combined SSN/EMPID) does not affect the general magnitudes or
significance levels of these estimated elasticities. In addition, the basic pattern of elasticities
across different worker and industry characteristics (wage quartiles, skill intensity, etc.) are the
same.
The estimates of elasticities of separation with respect to new hires are pretty much all
over the board and most insignificant for this restricted sample of undocumented workers.
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Among documented workers, the different years of analysis and use of the SSN as a fixed effect
(as opposed to the combined SSN/EMPID) does not generally affect the magnitude or
significance levels of these estimated elasticities.

V. Implications and Conclusions
The analysis in this paper presents evidence of employer monopsony power in the labor
market for undocumented workers. The limited employment and grievance opportunities of
undocumented workers makes this an un-surprising result, however this finding has implications
for firm profits and product prices. Firms who enjoy a monopsony position in the labor market
also enjoy greater profits from being able to pay at least some of its workers a wage lower than
their marginal revenue product. These firms may not take kindly to efforts to limit their supply
of inexpensive labor through stricter immigration policies. In addition, if those policies were
successful in limiting the supply of undocumented workers, resulting in higher production costs;
consumers may see the effect in the form of higher product prices (see Cortes 2008).
Alternatively, if policies were focused on eliminating the monopsony position of
employers, and employers paid all workers a wage equal to their marginal revenue product, they
would be indifferent between hiring documented and undocumented workers. While this may
not seem like a boon to documented workers, they would now be competing with undocumented
workers on skill and human capital rather than on a willingness to be paid less than their actual
contribution to the firm's output. Eliminating the firm's monopsony power would require
somehow legitimizing the presence of workers who are now considered undocumented. One
way to do this would be to create a permeable border, allowing the flow of workers to be dictated
by the demand of employers through something like a guest-worker program. Facilitating an
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employers' ability to draw workers from a larger pool when needed would likely have to be
accompanied by strictly enforced penalties for hiring workers outside of the guest-worker
program. Of course, policy makers may have other goals in mind, such as ensuring the highest
wage possible for U.S. citizens. If this is the case, the implications for immigration policy would
look very different.

- 23 -

References
Barth, Erling, and Harald Dale-Olsen, "Monopsonistic Discrmination and the Gender-wage
Gap," NBER Working Paper No. W7197, June 1999.
Barth, Erling, and Harald Dale-Olsen, "Monopsonistic Discrmination, Worker Turnover, and the
Gender-wage Gap," IZA Discussion Paper No. 3930, January 2009.
Benjamin, J.D.; P. Chinloy; G.D. Jud; and D.T. Winkler. "Do Some People Work Harder than
Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage." Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics 35(1) (July 2007): 95-110.
Bhaskar, V., Alan Manning, and Ted To, "Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor
Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2), 155-74, Spring 2002.
Bovbjerg, Barbara D. 2006. Social Security Numbers: Coordinated Approach to SSN Data Could
Help Reduce Unauthorized Work, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Social
Security and on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
GAO-06-458T, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06458t.pdf, (accessed 15 December
2008).
Brown, J. David; Julie L. Hotchkiss; and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli. "Undocumented Worker
Employment and Firm Survival." Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper
#2008-28 (December 2008).
Burdett, Kenneth and Dale T. Mortensen. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and
Unemployment." International Economic Review 39(2) (1988): 257-73.
Burgess, Simon; Julie Lane; and David Stevens. "Churning Dynamics: An Analysis of Hires and
Separations at the Employer Level." Labour Economics 8 (2001): 1-14.
Card, David and John DiNardo. "Do Immigrant Inflows Lead to Native Outflows?" American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90 (2) (May 2000), 360-7.
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. 2004. Greenbook, WMCP 108-6,
Section 4, (April).
Cortes, Patricia. "The Effect of Low-skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI
Data." Journal of Political Economy 116(3) (2008): 381-22.
Costa, Dora L. "The Wage and the Length of the Work Day: From the 1890s to 1991." Journal
of Labor Economics 18(1) (January 2000): 156-81.
DeFreitas, Gregory. "Hispanic Immigration and Labor Market Segmentation." Industrial
Relations 27(2) (Spring 1988): 195-214.

- 24 -

Ethier, Wilfred J. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-country Problem." The American Economic
Review 76(1) (March 1986): 56-71.
Fortuny, Karina; Randy Capps; and Jeffrey S. Passel. "The Characteristics of Unauthorized
Immigrants in California, Los Angeles County, and the United States." Mimeo.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute (March 2007).
Hall, Robert E. "Wages, Income, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force." In Glen G. Cain
and Harold W. Watts, eds. Income Maintenance and Labor Supply, pp. 102-62.
Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, 1973.
Hirsch, Boris, Thorsten Schank, and Claus Schnabel, "Gender Differences in Labor Supply to
Monopsonistic Firms: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked Employer-Employee Data
from Germany," Friedrich-alexander-Universitat Erlangen-Nurnberg Discussion Papers
No. 47, November 2006.
Hoefer, Michael; Nancy Rytina; and Christopher Campbell. "Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2006." Population
Estimates. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Immigration Statistics (August 2007).
Hoefer, Michael; Nancy Rytina; and Bryan C. Baker. "Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Residing in the United States: January 2008." Population Estimates.
Washington, D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics (February 2009).
Hotchkiss, Julie L. and Robert E. Moore. "Assessing the Welfare Impact of the 2001 Tax
Reform on Dual-Earner Families." FRBA Working Paper 2007-27 (December 2007).
Hotchkiss, Julie L. and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli. "The Impact of Undocumented Workers on
Documented Worker Wages." Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper #2009XX (forthcoming 2009).
Jovanovic, Boyan. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover." The Journal of Political
Economy 87(5, part 1) (October 1979): 972-90.
Lalonde, Robert and Robert Topel. "Labor Market Adjustments to Increased Immigration." In J.
Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, 167-200.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Lang, Kevin; Michael Manove; and William R. Dickens. "Racial Discrimination in Labor
Markets with Posted Wage Offers." American Economic Review 95(4) (September 132740).
Machin, Stephen and Alan Manning. "Testing Dynamic Models of Worker Effort." Journal of
Labor Economics 10(3) (July 1992): 288-305.

- 25 -

Manning, Alan. Monopsony in Motion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Morales, Rebecca. “Transitional Labor: Undocumented Workers in the Los Angeles Automobile
Industry,” International Migration Review, 17(4), (1983-1984): 570-596.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri. "Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on
Wages." NBER Working Paper #12497 (August 2006).
Ofek, Haim and Yesook Merrill. "Labor Immobility and the Formation of Gender Wage Gaps in
Local Markets." Economic Inquiry 35 (January 1997): 28-47.
Pedace, Roberto. "Immigration, Labor Market Mobility and the Earnings of Native-born
Workers: An Occupational Segmentation Approach." American Journal of Economics
and Sociology 65(2) (April 2006): 313-45.
Ransom, Michael R. and Ronald L. Oaxaca. "New Market Power Models and Sex Differences
in Pay." Mimeo, Brigham Young University (November 2007).
Raphael, Steven and David Riker. "Geographic Mobility, Race, and Wage Differentials."
Journal of Urban Economics 45 (January 1999): 17-46.
Rivera-Batiz, Franciso. "Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An Analysis of the
Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants in the United States." Journal of
Population Economics 12(1) (February 1999): 91-116.
Robinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macmillan: London, 1933.
Scott, Frank A. Jr.; James E. Long; and ken Somppi. "Salary vs. Marginal Revenue Product
under Monopsony and Competition: The Case of Professional Basketball." Atlantic
Economic Review 13(3) (September 1985): 50-9.
Scully, Gerald W. The Business of Major League Baseball. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1989.
Semple, Kirk. 2008. "With Economy, Day Laborer Jobs Dwindle." nytimes.com (20 October),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/nyregion/20laborers.html?partner=rssnyt>,
(accessed 20 October 2008).
Stark, Oded. 2007. "Work Effort, Moderation in Expulsion, and Illegal Migration." Review of
Development Economics 11 no. 4 (February): 585-90.
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, "Comparison of State
Unemployment Laws,"
<http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2008/comparison2008.asp>
(accessed 10 December 2008).

- 26 -

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Disclosure and Verification of Social
Security Numbers (SSNs) for the Section 235 Program." Mortgagee Letter 90-39 (9
November 1990).
<http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:5VRIgv1oFQYJ:www.fha.gov/reference/ml1990
/90-39ml.doc+pocketbook+social+security+numbers&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us>
(accessed 20 September 2007).
Yueh, Linda Y. "Do Social Networks Increase Labour Supply Elasticities." Applied Economics
Letters 15 (2008): 5-10.
Zimbalist, Andrew. Baseball and Billions. New York: Basic Books, 1992.

- 27 -

Figure 1.
Percent of workers with invalid SSN, by reason, construction, 1990:1 - 2006:4
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Figure 2.
Percent of workers that is undocumented by broad industry, 1990:1 - 2006:4
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Figure 3. Growth in the earnings suspense file and the total number and percent of workers
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006.
(a) Growth in earnings suspense file and number of
undocumented workers identified in Georgia, 1990-2006.

(b) Growth in earnings suspense file and percent of workers
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006.
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Source: Huse (2002) for estimates 1990-2000, Johnson (2007) for estimates 2001-2004, and authors'
calculations. Dollar estimates reflect 2006 values, using the PCE chain-weighted deflator.

Table 1. Correlation between percent of workers identified as undocumented by county and the
percent of firms that employ them, with the percent of the population in each county that is
Hispanic, African American, and Asian.
Percent of Firms Employing
Undocumented Workers
Percent of Undocumented
Percent of Population that is:
Workers in County
in County
Hispanic
0.18
0.38
Asian
-0.02
0.27
African American
-0.19
-0.13
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Table 2. Sample means.
Documented
1995-2000

Undocumented
1995-2000

$4,961
(12081)

$3,272
(7247)

Undocumented
1997-2000
ITIN only
$3,500
(5421)

[1-566]
[567-1,969]
[1,970-5,299]
[5,300-1,280,235]

[1-477]
[478-1,675]
[1,676-4,199]
[4,200-239,197]

[3-598]
[600-2,011]
[2,018-4,839]
[4,840-84,676]

Worker tenure (number of quarters)

3.20
(5.42)

1.66
(1.83)

1.65
(1.43)

Percent of workers separating

52%

69%

62%

Percent of workers newly hired

55%

71%

67%

Share of new hires in firm
undocumented
Share of workers in 6-digit NAICS
industry undocumented
Age of employer (number of quarters)

1.2%

11.4%

15.8%

1.3%

3.23%

3.68%

25.8
(11.6)

24.5
(12.4)

25.3
(13.8)

2,260
(5365)

1,175
(2943)

1,254
(3808)

56%

65%

63%

20%
67%
13%

33%
61%
6%

32%
63%
5%

1%
6%
11%
3%
3%
17%
4%
3%
23%

8%
12%
14%
1%
3%
7%
2%
<1%
23%

7%
18%
9%
<1%
3%
8%
2%
<1%
21%

Wage

First wage quartile range
Second wage quartile range
Third wage quartile range
Fourth wage quartile range

Employer size (number of workers)

Worker churning at place of
employment (documented wrkrs only)
Distribution by skill intensity
Low skill
Medium skill
High skill
NAICS Sector Shares
Natural Resources and Agriculture
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Financial Activities
Information
Professional and Business Services
(includes temporary services)
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Education and Health Services
Leisure and Hospitality
Other Services
(includes private household, laundry,
and repair and maintenance services)

7%
19%
3%

3%
23%
2%

2%
24%
4%

No. of observations
15,326,269
222,422
3,242
Notes: Wages are real quarterly earnings, deflated by the chained price index for personal
consumption expenditure $2006Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. Numbers in these cells
do not reflect number of observations used in estimation as the estimation procedure requires two
observations per worker to identify the fixed effect, thus reducing the usable sample size.
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Table 3. OLS fixed-effect linear probability estimates of separation equation.
Full Samples
Documented Undocumented

Variable
Intercept
ln(w)
Tenure
Age of employer
Employer size (# workers)/ 10000
Worker churning at place of employment
% of workers in industry that is undocumented
Percent of new hires in firm undocumented (h)
Y.Q
County unemployment rate

Adjusted R sq.
Labor supply elasticity ( ε nw )

1.1906*
(0.0869)
-0.1585*
(0.0011)
-0.0081*
(0.0004)
0.0003*
(0.0001)
-0.0168*
(0.0048)
0.1497*
(0.0047)
-0.0007
(0.0010)
0.0518*
(0.0171)
0.0044*
(0.0009)
^
-0.0016
(0.0007)

1.1365*
(0.1691)
-0.1498*
(0.0018)
-0.0387*
(0.0012)
0.0009*
(0.0002)
^
-0.0201
(0.0090)
0.0952*
(0.0091)
0.0004
(0.0009)
0.1433*
(0.0159)
0.0054*
(0.0017)
-0.0023
(0.0016)

0.31
0.569*

0.31
0.494*

0.0012*
0.0254*
Separation elasticity wrt % of new hires undoc ( ε sh )
No. of Observations
8,069,046
118,104
Notes: Analysis includes workers employed in Georgia 1995-2000 inclusive. Y.Q is a continuous
variable constructed as Y ∈ [97,100] and quarter Q ∈ [00,75]. The worker fixed effect is constructed as
a combination of the worker's SSN and worker's employer id number. Standard errors are corrected for
^
clustering at the firm level. * ⇒ statistical significance at the 99 percent confidence level; ⇒
+
statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level; ⇒ statistical significance at the 90 percent
confidence level.
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Table 4. Labor supply elasticities ( ε nw ) by wage quartiles and industry groups, for 1995-2000 samples
and for 1997-2000 sample restricted to undocumented workers with ITIN numbering scheme.

1995-2000
δ i = SSN EMPID

Undocumented workers
restricted to those with ITIN
1997-2000
δ i = SSN

Documented Undocumented Documented Undocumented
0.494*
0.619*
0.475*
0.569*

Full Sample
Wage Quartiles
Quartile 1
0.134*
0.085*
0.131*
0.261*
Quartile 2
0.689*
0.394*
0.746*
0.191
*
*
*
Quartile 3
1.391
1.732
2.215
1.154
^
*
0.250
Quartile 4
-0.027
1.270
-0.379
Skill Intensity
Low skill
0.593*
0.516*
0.590*
0.631*
Medium skill
0.561*
0.493*
0.596*
0.460*
High skill
0.687*
0.247*
0.885*
neo
NAICS Sector
^
0.291
Natural Resources and Ag.
0.433*
0.271*
0.420*
Construction
0.630*
0.635*
0.676*
0.359*
Manufacturing
0.716*
0.903*
0.878*
0.884*
Transportation & Utilities
0.681*
0.325*
0.753*
neo
*
*
*
Wholesale Trade
0.781
0.497
0.978
neo
+
*
*
Retail Trade
1.024
0.692
0.376
0.695
Financial Activities
0.303*
1.117*
0.850*
neo
*
*
Information
0.798
0.135
0.930
neo
*
*
*
Professional & Bus Srvcs
0.399
0 .464
0.382*
0.439
Education and Health
0.170*
0.893*
0.778*
neo
*
*
*
Leisure and Hospitality
0.617
0.586
0.803*
0.578
Other Services
0.444*
0.665*
0.536*
neo
See notes to Table 3. Confidence level determined by the significance of the underlying
estimated parameter coefficient. neo=not enough observations.
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Table 5. Elasticities of separation with respect to undocumented new hires ( ε sh ) by wage quartiles and
industry groups, for 1995-2000 samples and for 1997-2000 sample restricted to undocumented workers
with ITIN numbering scheme.

1995-2000
δ i = SSN EMPID
Full Sample
Wage Quartiles
Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4
Skill Intensity
Low skill
Medium skill
High skill
NAICS Sector
Natural Resources and Ag.
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation & Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Financial Activities
Information
Professional & Bus Srvcs
Education and Health
Leisure and Hospitality
Other Services
See notes to Table 3 and 4.

Undocumented workers
restricted to those with ITIN
1997-2000
δ i = SSN

Documented Undocumented Documented Undocumented
^
0.0009
0.0258*
-0.0210
0.0019*
+

0.0011*
0.0036*
0.0032*
^
0.0022

0.0078*
0.0082
0.0069
0.0766*

0.0005
0.0025*
+
0.0015
0.0005

0.0298
0.0038
-0.3703*
^
0.3526

0.0056*
0.0017*
0.0011

0.0313*
0.0230*
^
0.0381

0.0035*
^
0.0008
0.0002

0.0453
-0.0314

^

0.0496*
^
0.0257
0.0005
0.0500
^
0.0718
^
0.0269
0.0315
0.0967
0.0180*
^
0.0556
0.0141*
0.0234

-0.020
^
0.0022
-0.0022
0.0007
0.0009
0.0010*
+
-0.0026
^
-0.0058
-0.0004
+
0.0015
0.0055*
-0.0014

-0.0095
0.0023*
-0.0001
^
0.0020
0.0005
0.0019*
-0.0019
-0.0016
+
0.0010
0.0023*
0.0061*
0.0004
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^

neo

-0.0512
0.0504
^
0.3395
neo
neo

0.0044
neo
neo

-0.0126
neo

0.0516
neo

Appendix A: Definition of Sectors
Table A1: Definitions of sectors based on 2-digit NAIC classifications.
Sector

Included
2-digit NAIC
23

Construction
Manufacturing

31-33

Transportation and Utilities

22, 48-49

Wholesale Trade

42

Retail Trade

44-45

Financial Activities

52-53

Information

51

Professional and Business Services (includes temporary services)

54-56

Education and Health Services

61-62

Leisure and Hospitality

71-72

Other Services
(includes private household, laundry, and repair and maintenance services)

- A1 -

81

Appendix B: Skill Intensity Categories
Each industry is assigned a skill intensity based on the weighted average of educational
attainment of workers in that industry, using the Current Population Survey for 1994. This year
was chosen since this is the first year in which the nativity (place of birth) of respondents is
reported. For each industry, the percent of workers with less than a high school education
(LTHS), a high school education (HS), some college (SCOLL), college degree (COLL), and
graduate education (GRAD) is calculated. Skill intensity categories was assigned as follows:
1
0
1
0
1
0

0

0

About 23 percent of the industries are classified as high skill, 15 percent at low skill, and
62 percent at medium skill. Some examples of low skill industries include agriculture, some
manufacturing, and accommodation and food services. Medium skill industries include
construction, retail trade, some manufacturing, some education and health, and arts and
entertainment. High skill industries include the information sector, electronic computer
manufacturing, the financial sector, and some education and health.
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